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ABSTRACT
Machine learning has become one of the main components for task
automation in many application domains. Despite the advance-
ments and impressive achievements of machine learning, it has
been shown that learning algorithms can be compromised by at-
tackers both at training and test time. Machine learning systems
are especially vulnerable to adversarial examples where small per-
turbations added to the original data points can produce incorrect
or unexpected outputs in the learning algorithms at test time. Miti-
gation of these attacks is hard as adversarial examples are difficult
to detect. Existing related work states that the security of machine
learning systems against adversarial examples can be weakened
when feature selection is applied to reduce the systems’ complexity.
In this paper, we empirically disprove this idea, showing that the
relative distortion that the attacker has to introduce to succeed
in the attack is greater when the target is using a reduced set of
features. We also show that the minimal adversarial examples differ
statistically more strongly from genuine examples with a lower
number of features. However, reducing the feature count can nega-
tively impact the system’s performance. We illustrate the trade-off
between security and accuracy with specific examples. We propose
a design methodology to evaluate the security of machine learn-
ing classifiers with embedded feature selection against adversarial
examples crafted using different attack strategies.
KEYWORDS
Adversarial machine learning, adversarial examples, feature selec-
tion.
1 INTRODUCTION
Machine learning has proven to be a powerful tool for the automa-
tion of many tasks, even outperforming humans in some instances.
It offers important benefits in terms of new functionality, personal-
isation, and optimisation of resources. Given the huge amount of
data available from diverse sources, machine learning has become
the main component of many systems. Despite the rapid devel-
opment of new techniques, it has also been shown that machine
learning systems are vulnerable. Attackers can perform poisoning
attacks by injecting malicious examples into the training dataset
[5, 17, 27, 32, 33], subverting the learning process and thus de-
grading the performance of the system in either a targeted or an
indiscriminate manner. Attackers can also exploit the system’s
weaknesses and blind spots at test time by crafting malicious exam-
ples that produce intentional errors and evade detection [3, 7, 16, 36].
Some of these attacks have already been reported in the wild in
different applications, such as autonomous bots and malware detec-
tion, among others. These vulnerabilities can hinder the adoption
of machine learning and have fostered a growing research commu-
nity in adversarial machine learning [16, 26, 31, 37], which aims
to understand the mechanisms that can allow attackers to com-
promise or evade the learning algorithms, propose mechanisms to
mitigate the effect of these vulnerabilities, and provide new design
methodologies for more secure systems.
It has been shown that machine learning models are often vulner-
able to adversarial examples, i.e. samples that are slightly modified
by an adversary to produce intentional errors in the system at test
time [3, 11, 36, 43]. Szegedy et al. [43] have shown show the vulnera-
bilities of neural networks against adversarial examples in computer
vision problems. They have also shown that detecting such attacks
is challenging as they usually require adding only small perturba-
tions to the original image, which makes adversarial examples un-
detectable even to the human eye. This problem has recently led to
an increasing number of contributions, especially in the context of
deep networks, as for example in [7, 11, 19, 20, 25, 29, 30, 36, 38, 45].
Defensive techniques attempting to mitigate this problem have
been proposed in the research literature. We can broadly classify
these defences into two groups: On one side, some techniques aim
to classify adversarial examples [14, 18, 38, 40, 48]. Other defences
try to detect them instead [2, 9, 13, 15, 23, 28]. However, Carlini
& Wagner [6] showed that most of these defences can be defeated
if the attacker crafts adversarial examples targeting the specific
defence, although some techniques indeed help to mitigate the
problem, such as the adversarial training techniques in [25, 45].
Adversarial examples are produced in regions where there is
a mismatch between the learned model and the ideal model we
would obtain if we could completely characterise the underlying
data distribution (i.e. if we had an infinite number of training points).
There are trivial cases where the attacker can leverage regions not
supported by the training data points, where the attacks can be
easily detected through appropriate anomaly detection. However,
adversarial examples are produced in regions where training data
does not occur naturally, or only with very low probability, but are
sufficiently close to the genuine data points such that detection
becomes extremely challenging, especially in high-dimensional
datasets. Goodfellow et al. [11] claim that, in the case of neural
networks, there is an excess of linearity in the behaviour of the net-
works. However, attack transferability [35, 43] suggest that adver-
sarial regions are shared across different machine learning models,
enabling black-box attacks by using substitute models [1], which
indicates that different learning algorithms suffer from the same
limitations.
Dimensionality reduction through feature selection and extrac-
tion have also been explored in the research literature with con-
tradictory conclusions. Bhagoji et al. [2] showed that linear dimen-
sionality reduction with Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and
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anti-whitening helps to enhance the robustness of machine learning
systems against evasion attacks. The other side [4, 46, 47] claims
that applying dimensionality reduction through feature selection
yields models that are less secure against evasion attacks compared
to models that use the full feature set. In [4, 47] filter and wrap-
per feature selection methods are proposed, which often produce
less optimal model than embedded feature selection, such as Lasso.
Wang et al. [46] analyse the security properties of Lasso, but the
attacker model is unrealistic under white-box settings. Although in
these three works experimental evidence is shown to support the
validity of their hypotheses, the proposed experimental methodol-
ogy relies on metrics that compare the overall perturbation that the
attacker needs to introduce to succeed. However, as models with
different numbers of features are compared, this does not provide
a fair comparison on the perturbation relative to the number of
features used.
In this paper, we show that in linear learning algorithms, em-
bedded feature selection increases the systems’ robustness against
adversarial examples, considering minimal white box attacks. We
propose a methodology to compare the security of learning algo-
rithms against different evasion attacks for models with different
feature counts. We also show that there is a natural trade-off be-
tween accuracy and security as a function of the selected number
of features. Thus, the contributions of the paper are the following:
• We propose a methodology to compare the security of
machine learning classifiers with different numbers of fea-
tures against different forms of attacks, according to the
norm used to measure the perturbation introduced in the
adversarial examples. We propose to use a normalised av-
erage minimum distance to measure the relative minimum
distortion the required for a successful attack.
• We propose an aggregated metric to assess the security
of the learning algorithms against adversarial examples,
considering different types of attacks.
• We empirically show that embedded feature selection en-
hances the robustness of linear machine learning classifiers
against adversarial attacks. We characterise the tradeoff
between accuracy and security in these models and show
that, in some cases, by sacrificing a bit of accuracy, we
can significantly increase the resilience of our system to
adversarial examples.
• We also show empirically that the statistical difference
between adversarial and genuine examples is significantly
higher when feature selection is applied. This supports the
validity of our normalised metrics and the argument that
embedded feature selection mitigates evasion attacks, as
the detection of adversarial examples is easier when the
number of features is reduced.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: In Section 2 we
provide the background and relevant related work. In Section 3
we describe our design and testing methodology to evaluate the
robustness of feature selection against attacks at test time. In Section
4 we provide a comprehensive experimental evaluation showing
the benefits of feature selection to enhance the security of machine
learning systems and the trade-off between security and accuracy.
Finally, Section 5 discuss the main contributions of the paper and
sketch future research avenues.
2 RELATEDWORK
A comprehensive classification of the different threats against ma-
chine learning systems is described in [16], providing a taxonomy
of attacks according to various criteria. An updated and revised
threat model can be found in [37]. In this paper we focus on evasion
attacks, i.e. those produced at test time, targeting machine learning
classifiers.
Szegedy et al. [43] were the first to show the existence of adver-
sarial examples in neural networks and deep learning systems, but
as shown in [16], previous works in adversarial machine learning
analysed evasion attacks in the context of linear classification. Thus,
Lowd and Meek [24] proposed an algorithm to reverse engineer
linear classifiers. Nelson et al. [34] extended previous work to con-
sider evasion attacks in convex-inducing classifiers. In [3], Biggio et
al. proposed an evasion attack where the adversary aims to find the
perturbation that minimises the discriminant function for the ad-
versarial example given the maximum level of perturbation allowed
for the attacker.
A different approach to model the attacker’s problem is usually
considered in the literature [7, 36, 43] where the attacker aims to
find the minimum perturbation that achieves evasion. This can be
written as:1
x∗ = argmin
x ′
d(x ′,x) s.t. F (x ′) = yt (1)
where d is a distance function, x is the sample to be perturbed, F (x)
is the predictive function of the classifier and yt is the target label.
Different distance functions can be considered by the attacker, such
as L1, L2 or L∞ norms. Thus, the attacker aims to find the minimum
distortion that misclassifies the adversarial example as yt . We can
model both indiscriminate and targeted attacks depending on the
class of errors that the attacker wants to produce.
Solving the previous optimisation problem can be non-trivial
for some machine learning architectures, such as deep learning
[21] where the problem is non-convex and non-linear. On the other
hand, scalability problems in high-dimensional datasets hinders the
practical application of these attack strategies. More scalable and
fast attacks have already been proposed in the research literature
[11, 20, 29, 30], showing that even an approximation to the optimal
formulation in (1) is still very effective in successfully evading
machine learning systems.
On the defensive side, several mechanisms have already been
proposed to either correctly classify or detect adversarial examples.
However, Carlini and Wagner [6] have shown that some of the
strongest detection techniques can be bypassed by crafting attacks
that target them specifically. Amongst the techniques that aim
to correctly classify attacks, adversarial training has been proven
to help mitigate the effect of evasion attacks by augmenting the
training data with adversarial examples [43]. Madry et al. [25]
proposed to compute adversarial perturbations at training time to
make the learning algorithms more robust to adversarial examples.
Kurakin et al. [20] used a single-step attack to train an Inception v3
1Variants of this attack formulation can be found across different papers in the research
literature.
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model [42] adversarially by linearising themodel’s loss. Tramer et al.
[45] proposed to augment the training data with adversarial samples
transferred from different models, increasing the robustness against
black-box attacks.
In this paper we propose a different approach to enhance the ro-
bustness of machine learning systems against adversarial examples
by reducing the model complexity with feature selection. Bhagoji
et al. [2] proposed to use dimensionality reduction through lin-
ear transformation with PCA to enhance the security of machine
learning systems. The authors claim that by eliminating compo-
nents with low variance, the attacker is limited to less optimal
perturbations. They also proposed anti-whitening as a mechanism
to exaggerate the disparity between the variances of the compo-
nents in PCA. Thus, instead of cutting off low variance components,
it increases the price of accessing them.
Biggio et al. [4] proposed a framework to evaluate empirically
the security of machine learning classifiers at design time. They
provide some experimental evidence, using information gain in
filter-based feature selection technique. They concluded that feature
selection makes models less robust against evasion attacks. The
experimental evidence is only provided for L0 norm attacks using
binary features. However, the experimental comparison is not fair,
as the models with different features counts are compared according
to the total level of distortion. As we will show in the next sections,
this methodology can produce misleading results. Furthermore,
filter-based feature selection often produces less optimal models
than wrapper and embedded feature selection techniques.
Zhang et al. [47] proposed an adversary-aware feature selection
approach for binary classifiers based on an optimisation problem
that considers at the same time the generalisation capabilities of the
learning algorithm (i.e. the classification accuracy) and the robust-
ness against evasion attacks (measured as the average minimum
number of modifications required to evade the classifier). The pro-
posed optimisation problem can be approximately solved using
wrapper-based feature selection such as forward selection and back-
ward elimination. As in [4], the experimental evaluation suggests
that feature selection makes models less secure, as the attacker is
required to modify fewer features to succeed in the attack. However,
as in the previous case, the comparison between models with differ-
ent features is based on the absolute number of modifications, not
on the relative perturbation per feature. The proposed methodology
does not provide an aggregate measure to assess the security of
machine learning classifiers against different types of attacks. On
the other hand, the authors use greedy wrapper feature selection
methods, which usually produce less optimal results compared to
embedded feature selection.
Finally, Wang et al. [46] devised a game between a regularised
(binary) classifier and an attacker under white-box settings. The
game starts with the attacker injecting worst-case perturbations to
positive examples. Then, the classifier re-adjusts its parameters on
the dataset altered by the attacker. The algorithm is repeated until
convergence. The experimental evaluation in [46] shows that, as
the attack strength increases, the accuracy of L1 (Lasso) regularised
models degrade more gracefully compared to L2 regularised ones.
However, the attacker model proposed is suboptimal, as the attacker
selects features to modify at random. There is also no comparison
against non-regularised models to assess whether L1 and L2 are
more secure against evasion attacks.
3 MITIGATION OF EVASION ATTACKS WITH
EMBEDDED FEATURE SELECTION
Feature selection techniques aim to select subsets of relevant fea-
tures to reduce model complexity while minimising the loss of
information. In this section, we propose an evaluation methodol-
ogy to assess the security of machine learning classifiers against
different types of evasion attacks when feature selection is applied.
We provide a mechanism to compare the attack strengths required
to craft successful adversarial examples for models with different
feature counts by considering the average normalised minimum
distortion introduced by the attacker.
In the rest of this section, we first provide motivation for the
use of feature selection to mitigate the effect of evasion attacks,
which includes a synthetic example. Then, we briefly review em-
bedded feature selection methods, focusing on Lasso, and the attack
strategies used to craft successful adversarial examples with min-
imum perturbations. Finally, we describe our security evaluation
methodology.
3.1 Motivation
Adversarial examples are possible in regions of sample space where
there is a mismatch between the ideal, true model, which we would
learn if we could completely characterise the data distribution, and
the model learned by the machine learning algorithm on a finite
set of training points. Transferability of attacks [35] suggests that
these adversarial regions are, to some extent, shared across different
machine learning models. It is reasonable to hypothesise that the
transferability of attacks is due to the lack of data in the adversarial
regions, i.e. adversarial examples can be produced in regions where
genuine data does not occur naturally (or occurs infrequently), but
that are sufficiently close to regions where the probability density
of data points is high. This makes adversarial examples difficult to
detect, especially when the number of features is high. Adversarial
training aims to inject adversarial examples in the training set to
fill in some of these adversarial regions to make the system more
robust.
In this paper, we propose to use a different approach to deal with
model complexity that can be complementary to adversarial train-
ing. Complex models require more training data to produce more
accurate predictions and to reduce the mismatch between the ideal
model and the learned model.2 Feature selection is a well-known
mechanism to reduce model complexity, eliminating variables that
are irrelevant, redundant, or provide little information to solve the
learning task. Thus, by reducing the feature set used by the learning
algorithm we also reduce model complexity. However, reduction
in the number of features implies a trade-off between accuracy
and complexity, i.e. performance can decrease when reducing the
number of features. However, by reducing model complexity with
feature selection, we expect to shrink the regions that can be lever-
aged by the attacker to craft adversarial examples.
2Provided that the learning algorithm has enough expressive power, e.g. a linear
classifier cannot approximate the true decision boundary in a non-linear problem even
if we had an infinite number of training points.
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Figure 1: Synthetic binary classification dataset where only
one of the features is relevant to solve the classification
task. Blue line depicts the Bayes optimal decision boundary;
green line depicts the decision boundary learned by an SVM
considering only the relevant feature; orange line represent
the decision boundary of an SVM that learns using the 2 fea-
tures. It can be appreciated that the mismatch between the
true and the learned decision boundary is higher when we
use the two features to train the SVM, which increases the
opportunity for attackers to craft successful adversarial ex-
amples.
To illustrate this, we show in Figure 1 a 2-dimensional synthetic
example for binary classification where the first feature of class 0
data points was drawn from the Gaussian distribution N(2, 0.25),
whereas the first feature of class 1 points was drawn fromN(4, 0.25).
The second feature of all data points was drawn from N(3, 0.25).
Hence, class 0 and class 1 instances only differ in the distribution of
the first feature. We generated 10 points for each class and trained
two SVM classifiers: one using both features and another using
only the first (relevant) feature. As we know the underlying data
distribution, we can also characterise the Bayes optimal decision
boundary. In Figure 1, we can observe that if both features were
used during training, the difference between the learned and true
decision boundaries (i.e. the adversarial region) is large, as the
hyperplane fits to the noise of the irrelevant feature. In contrast,
training with only the relevant feature yields a decision boundary
much closer to the true one.
Typically, adversarial examples leverage some of the most im-
portant features for the learning algorithm, allowing small changes
in the inputs to produce large changes to the output. However, less
important features also need to be modified sometimes to craft opti-
mal attacks. Thus, by eliminating unimportant features, the attacker
can no longer manipulate them to change the decision output. As a
result, the relative perturbation per feature that the attacker needs
to introduce increases, i.e. with fewer features, the attack distance
might account for a larger proportion of the maximum possible
attack distance. Hence, we can expect adversarial samples to show
stronger discrepancy with clean samples in reduced space. This
could make it easier for statistical anomaly detection techniques to
detect attacks. Our experimental evaluation in Section 4 validates
this hypothesis.
3.2 Embedded Feature Selection
Feature selection methods are usually grouped into three categories
according to how feature selection interacts with the learning algo-
rithm. Filter methods do not consider the learning algorithm at all
when selecting the features. They usually rely on the mutual infor-
mation between each feature and the predicted variable.Wrapper
methods rely on evaluating the performance of classifiers trained
on different subsets of features. Although they consider the depen-
dencies between the features, these methods are computationally
demanding for large sets of features, as they require the model to
be retrained for every feature subset evaluated. Finally, embedded
feature selection incorporates feature selection into the training
process of the learning algorithm.
Lasso [44] is a well-known method for the regularisation of
linear regression models, where introducing a constraint on the
L1 norm of a model’s parameters (excluding the bias) improves its
generalisability and, at the same time, performs variable selection,
which is achieved by introducing sparsity in the solution, i.e. the
coefficients of the less relevant features a zeroed.
Given a cost function C(Dtr ,w) evaluated on a training dataset
Dtr , the parameters of the model can be learned by solving the
optimisation problem:
w∗ ∈ min
w
C(Dtr ,w) + λ∥w∥1. (2)
where the regularisation parameter λ controls the sparsity of the
model, performing feature selection automatically. Thus, larger
values of λ induce models with less features.
L2 penalty terms are also used as a regularisation technique to
prevent overfitting. L2 regularisation does not force model sparsity,
so it cannot be applied as feature selection per se, but it is possible to
perform feature selection by zeroing weights whose magnitudes are
below a given threshold. However, if two ormore features are highly
correlated, then it is reasonable to keep only one of the features to
simplify the model complexity. Regardless, L2 regularisation will
distribute weights somewhat equally among them, which could
result in all of these features being removed or kept. In contrast,
Lasso (L1 regularisation), does not suffer from this problem and
automatically selects the best features to keep.
3.3 Attack Strategy
We evaluate the robustness of classifiers by craftingminimal attacks,
defined in equation (1). A minimal attack is an adversarial sample
that barely causes the classifier to misclassify it as the target class
and whose distance to the source sample is minimal according to
some distance metric. Such attacks allow us to establish the lower
bound of a classifier’s robustness.
To find the minimal attack for a sample, we use the Jacobian-
based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) [36] to solve
x∗ = argmax
x ′
ℓ(f (x ′),y) s.t. d(x ′, x) < Γ (3)
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where ℓ(f (x ′),y) is the cross entropy loss between the classifier
output f (x) and the original class, and Γ is the maximum attack
distance. Solving the above optimisation problem yields an adver-
sarial sample that maximises the prediction error under a given
distance budget. An approximate solution to (1) can be obtained by
performing binary search on Γ.
Algorithm (1) shows our adaptation of JSMA to solve (3) under
L1, L2 and L∞ distance constraints. We enforce the attack norm
constraints by projecting the perturbation vector δ∗ onto Lp space
in each iteration of the gradient ascent on the optimisation problem.
L2 (Algorithm 3) and L∞ (Algorithm 4) projections are straightfor-
ward, whereas the projection onto the L1 (Algorithm 2) space is
more involved and requires approximations to compute it efficiently.
For this, we use the O(n logn) algorithm introduced by Duchi et
al.[8].3
Algorithm 1 Attack algorithm
Input: X : source sample; Y : original class; Y ∗: target class; l : cross
entropy loss; f : output of network; Γ: maximum distance; p: attack
norm; α : step size
Output: X ∗: adversarial sample
1: X ∗ ← X
2: while f (X ∗) , Y ∗ do
3: δ ← α · ∂l (f (X ∗),Y )
∂X ∗
4: δ ′ ← X ∗ −X + δ
5: δ∗ ← projectLp (δ ′, Γ)
6: X ∗ ← X + δ∗
Algorithm 2 projectL1 [8]
Input:v ∈ Rn : vector to be projected; d ∈ R > 0: maximum
L1-norm of the projected vector
Output:w ∈ Rn : projected vector which solves minw ′ ∥w ′ −v ∥22
s.t. ∥w ′∥1 ≤ d
1: Define u where ui = |vi |
2: µ ← u sorted in descending order
3: ρ ← max
{
j ∈ {1, ...,n} : µ j − 1j
(∑j
r=1 µr − d
)
> 0
}
4: θ ← 1ρ
(∑ρ
i=1 µi − d
)
5: Define z where zi = max {ui − θ , 0}
6: w ← siдn(v)⋆ z
Algorithm 3 projectL2
Input:v ∈ Rn : vector to be projected; d ∈ R > 0: maximum
L2-norm of the projected vector
Output:w ∈ Rn : projected vector which solves minw ′ ∥w ′ −v ∥22
s.t. ∥w ′∥2 ≤ d
1: n ← ∥v ∥2
2: w ← v ·dn
3While they also provided a linear time algorithm in the same paper, we found the
O(n logn) version to perform 3x times as fast in our implementation.
Algorithm 4 projectL∞
Input:v ∈ Rn : vector to be projected; d ∈ R > 0: maximum
L∞-norm of the projected vector
Output:w ∈ Rn : projected vector which solves minw ′ ∥w ′ −v ∥22
s.t. ∥w ′∥∞ ≤ d
1: Definew wherewi = min {max {wi ,−d} ,d}
3.4 Security Evaluation
3.4.1 Distance Metric. Related works on feature selection in
adversarial settings [4, 47] use the same metric to compare the
robustness of models with different input dimensions.We argue that
this is not appropriate because applying feature selection results in a
different classification problem from the original one, and the same
perturbation applied to the input of a smaller model means a bigger
proportional change. This could mean that adversarial examples
are easier to detect under reduced feature sets. To account for the
differences in input dimensions, we argue that it is necessary to
normalise the minimal attack distance. This leads to different results
from those reported in the related works.
Simon-Gabriel et al.[41] describe away to scale the attack strength
according to the attack norm and input dimension. To preserve the
average signal-to-noise ratio ∥x ∥2/∥δ ∥2, they suggest to compute
the attack strength used with Lp -attacks as
Γp = c f
1/p
where c is a dimension-independent constant and f is the input
dimension. The scaling is useful for normalising attack strengths
across different models for a fixed value of c . This allows metrics
such as evasion rate to be measured against the fixed normalised
attack strength. However, if we use minimal adversarial samples,
the attack strength is variable. Hence, we propose to divide the
minimal attack distance by the normalising factor f 1/p :
Γp =
Γmin
f 1/p
∈ [0, 1] . (4)
Assuming all feature values are between 0 and 1, the normalised
attack distance denotes the ratio between the distortion strength
and the maximum possible distortion strength. This metric captures
the percentage of distortion as decimal and can be used to compare
models with different input dimensions intuitively. We theorise
that it is correlated with statistical deviation from clean samples
and prove this empirically in Subsection 4.3.
Tomeasure the robustness of a model against attacks constrained
by Lp norm, we craft minimal Lp attacks with Algorithm (1) from
a set of samples and compute the average of the normalised attack
distances across these samples.
3.4.2 Security Score. As the defender cannot anticipate the type
of attack an adversary will use, the distortion percentage for a
specific attack norm is by itself insufficient to measure a model’s
general robustness against attacks.We propose to use an aggregated
security s ∈ [0, 1] by averaging over the normalised attack distances
for all attack norms used in the security evaluation:
s =
1
|P |
∑
p∈P
Γp
f 1/p
(5)
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where P is the set of all attack norms considered. Comparing s
against the prediction accuracy allows us to study the trade-off
between security and accuracy as we vary the aggressiveness of
feature selection.
3.4.3 Statistical Analysis of Attacks. To evaluate how feature
selection affects the detectability of adversarial samples, similar
to [13] , we use Maximum Mean Discrepancy (MMD) [10] to mea-
sure the statistical distance between adversarial and clean samples.
Given two sets of samples drawn from different data distributions,
X = {x1, ...,xn } ∼ p and Z = {z1, ..., zn } ∼ q, the MMD is defined
as
D(X ,Z ,F ) = sup
f ∈F
Ep [f (x)] − Eq [f (z)]
whereF is a class of functions andE is the expectation.D(X ,Z ,F ) =
0 iff p = q.
Its unbiased empirical estimate [12] can be computed as
D̂(X ,Y ) = 1
n2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
K(xi ,x j ) − 2
nm
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
K(xi , zj )
+
1
m2
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
K(zi , zj ) (6)
where K is a kernel function.
Grosse et al.[13] have shown that the MMD between adversarial
and clean samples is significantly higher than the MMD between
two sets of clean samples, thus proving the effectiveness of this
metric in detecting attacks.
While they used a Gaussian kernel in their experiments, we
opt to use the normalised linear kernel which does not make any
assumptions about the underlying distributions and mitigates dis-
crepancies caused by differences in input dimension:
K(x , z) = x
⊺z
∥x ∥1∥z∥1 .
Our experimental evaluation in Section 4 shows that the MDD of
adversarial examples increases as we reduce the number of features.
3.5 Feature Representation vs Feature Selection
It is important to distinguish between feature representation and
feature selection, especially when designing machine learning sys-
tems with security considerations. In the first case we refer to the
set of features considered in the design of the system, regardless of
the importance of the features. In contrast, once this set of features
is defined, feature selection aims to select the relevant features
based on the data available for training the learning algorithm.
Feature representation not only affects the performance of the
system, but it can also have a significant impact on the robustness
of the system against evasion attacks, as attackers can evade the
machine learning system by using features that are not considered
during the design of the system. For instance, in spam filtering
applications, attackers can misspell bad words (e.g. by substituting
profit with prof1t), so that if there are no mechanisms in place
to deal with such obfuscation techniques, the attacker can easily
evade detection, ignoring other possible vulnerabilities of learning
algorithm.
In feature selection, based on the training data available, we
remove features that are not important or redundant for the learning
task. Although the attacker can leverage the removed features to try
to evade the system, if the training data representation is reasonable,
possibly the use of these features does not bring important value
for the attacker, for example in terms of functionality, to fulfil her
goals.
In some security applications such as malware or anomaly de-
tection, other feature selection techniques can be considered to
prevent the attacker from evading the system. In these cases, the
attacker typically only aims to produce one type of error in the
system, i.e. to craft malicious examples that are misclassified as
benign. Therefore, a possible approach is to perform asymmetrical
feature selection by removing only features that are indicative of
benign behaviour.
4 EXPERIMENTS
In this section we show our experimental evaluation on the security
of classifiers trained using embedded feature selection through L1
regularisation. We show that by reducing the number of features
used by the learning algorithm, we increase the security, as the
attacker is required to introduce higher relative distortion in the
adversarial examples to succeed. We also show the natural trade-off
between security and accuracy in these settings. We observe that
some predictive accuracy can be sacrificed to significantly increase a
model’s security. Finally, we show that adversarial examples crafted
with theminimal attack strategy described in Section 3.3 statistically
differ more strongly from the genuine examples when number of
features is reduced, proving that it is easier to detect adversarial
examples for reduced feature subsets. This also supports the use
of our methodology that considers the relative perturbation added
to the adversarial examples rather than the absolute values, as
proposed in previous related works.
In our experiments we analyse the security of logistic regression
classifiers on 3 real binary classification datasets:
• MNIST [22] is a well-known image dataset containing
handwritten digits labelled from 0 to 9. Each data sam-
ple is a gray scale 28 × 28 image with 784 features, each
representing a pixel. We focus on the subset consisting of
handwritten 7s and 9s, as they have visually similar com-
ponents. We assign class 1 to the former and class 0 to the
latter. There are 7,293 class 1 and 6,958 class 0 samples in
total.
• Ransomware: This dataset contains data points with 232
features, which is a subset of full feature set in [39]. The
features represent the frequencies of API invocations ob-
tained during the dynamic analysis of ransomware and
benign applications. It includes 828 ransomware samples
(class 1) and 942 samples of benign software (class 0).
• PDFMalware: This is a subset of the PDFMalware dataset
used in [3] with 5,993 positive and 5,951 negative samples.
There are 114 features representing the occurrence of spe-
cific keywords relevant to detect malicious PDF files. We
have normalised all the features to the interval [0, 1].
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Figure 2: Averaged unnormalised minimal attack distance
for MNIST as a function of the number of features for L1, L2,
and L∞ attacks.
In our experimental evaluation, we employ 10-fold cross vali-
dation, using 9 folds for training and 1 for crafting the adversarial
examples.
All models are trained using standard gradient descent on the
sigmoid cross entropy loss function, implemented using Tensorflow.
Different input dimensions are obtained by an automated process
that searches for suitable multipliers for the regularisation term.
It should be noted that Tensorflow’s implementation of gradient
descent optimiser does not yield truly sparse weights with L1 regu-
larisation, as weights end up with very small magnitudes instead of
being zeroed. To get sparse solutions, we specify a small threshold
for the weight magnitude under which weights are zeroed. We use
a threshold of 0.01 for models trained on MNIST and Ransomware,
and 0.1 in the case of PDF Malware.
4.1 Attack Resistance
In our first experiment we evaluate the robustness of regularised
logistic regression classifiers against adversarial examples crafted
with the attack described in Section 3.3. Following a similar pre-
sentation to those used in [4, 47], Figure 2 shows the average un-
normalised minimal attack distances for L1, L2 and L∞ attacks
targeting logistic regression classifiers on MNIST with varying
levels of regularisation. In the case of L1 attacks, Γmin increases
significantly and monotonically with the number of features, f ,
with Γmin for the full model being three times as high as Γmin for
the smallest model with only 10 features. For L2 attacks, the average
Γmin is stable across all but the smallest model, where the overall
unnormalised perturbation is smaller. In contrast to the results for
L1 and L2 attacks, embedded feature selection with Lasso decreases
the minimal distance for L∞ attacks as f decreases .
Based on the results in Figure 2 alone, it is easy to jump to the
conclusion that embedded feature selection can have a negative im-
pact on the overall security of classifiers, as the overall perturbation
needed to craft successful L1 and L2 attack samples is smaller for
reduced feature sets. However, it is no coincidence that the opposite
effect is observed for L∞ attacks, where the distance is naturally
normalised according to (4).
Figure 3: Averaged normalised minimal attack distance for
MNIST as a function of the number of features selected for
L1, L2, and L∞ attacks.
Figure 4: Averaged normalised minimal attack distance to
evade an L1 regularised logistic regression classifier with dif-
ferent number of features in Ransomware dataset.
Figure 3 shows the security analysis of classifiers with different
numbers of features when the distance values are normalised. We
can observe that feature selection increases the attacker’s propor-
tional effort significantly for the 3 attacks as f decreases. Compar-
ing the model with all the features (784) to the model with only 10
features, the normalised distortion increases 4 times for L1 attacks,
7 times for L2 attacks, and 10 times for L∞ attacks.
Similar results are shown in Figures (4) and (5) for the Ran-
somware and PDF Malware datasets respectively. In all cases the
normalised minimal attack distance decreases with the number of
features, showing that the attacker has to increase the relative effort
per feature to successfully evade the logistic regression classifier.
4.2 Accuracy vs. Security Trade-off
Reduction in the number of features can also lead to a decrease
in the performance of a machine learning system, especially with
strongly reduced feature sets. Thus, in view of the previous results,
we can expect a natural trade-off between security and accuracy.We
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Figure 5: Averaged normalised minimal attack distance to
evade an L1 regularised logistic regression classifier with dif-
ferent number of features in PDF Malware dataset.
will now characterise this tradeoff in our examples. It is important to
be able to do so in order to choose appropriately between sacrificing
accuracy and increasing robustness. In our second experiment we
compute the security score s given in (5) for each model. As in the
previous experiment we consider L1, L2, and L∞ attacks.
Figure 6 plots s against the prediction accuracy of logistic regres-
sion classifiers with different number of features for the MNIST
dataset. As expected, the accuracy decreases and the security in-
creases with the feature count. The model with 10 features is 5 times
more secure than the model with all the features with a reduction
in performance of about 4.5%. With 100 features, the model is ap-
proximately 2 times more secure with a reduction in performance
of about 1.5% compared to the complete model.
Figure 7 shows similar results for the Ransomware dataset, where
the model with 10 features is approximately 3.5 times more secure
with a reduction in performance of about 6%. We can also appreciate
that models with 50 features doubles the security of the system
with a very small loss in performance.
Finally, the results for the PDFMalware dataset in Figure 8 shows
that with a low loss in accuracy, we can significantly increase the
security of the machine learning classifier. For example, a model
with 10 features increases robustness by 0.7 times with a 0.3% drop
in accuracy.
These representations show the trade-off between accuracy and
security, which can be helpful for the design of machine learning
systems with security considerations. They allow us to compare
models with different number of features, which helps us select
operations points according to different security and performance
criteria. The results suggest that for each classification task, small
sacrifices in accuracy can be made for large increases in robustness.
Similar analyses can be performed by looking at the security as a
function of the false positive or false negative rates of the machine
learning classifiers.
4.3 Statistical Analysis of Adversarial Samples
In the final experiment we provide some empirical support for our
evaluation methodology which considers the normalised distortion
Figure 6: Trade-offbetweenprediction accuracy and security
score on MNIST dataset.
Figure 7: Trade-offbetweenprediction accuracy and security
score on Ransomware dataset.
Figure 8: Trade-offbetweenprediction accuracy and security
score on PDF Malware dataset.
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Figure 9: MMD estimates for the MNIST dataset and minimal attacks with different feature counts. The different plots are
separated by the attack norm and the source class of attacks. Xtra , Xtsta and X ∗a denote the set of class a training, test and
adversarial samples respectively. Note that the y-axis is in logarithmic scale, as some values are orders of magnitudes higher
than others. A linear scale version of the plots can be found in Appendix A, highlighting the differences in the results.
as opposed to the unnormalised distortion metric used in previous
related work [4, 47]. We show that as the relative effort to craft
minimal adversarial examples increases when the number of fea-
tures decreases, the statistical difference between adversarial and
genuine samples grows as well.
For the 3 datasets and the 3 attacks considered before, we com-
pute the MMD estimates D̂ (6) between clean training samples and
test samples of the same class to serve as baselines. To determine
the statistical detectability of attacks, we compute D̂ between the
adversarial samples and clean training samples, separated by class.
For the 3 datasets and the 3 attacks considered before, we have
computed the MMD estimates D̂ (6) between clean training samples
and test samples of the same class to serve as baselines. To determine
the statistical detectability of attacks, we have computed D̂ between
the adversarial samples and clean training samples, separated by
class.
Figure 9 shows the average MMD estimates in logarithmic scale
for the MNIST dataset as a function of the number of features kept.
We can observe that for all input dimensions, the D̂ values between
training and adversarial samples are 1 to 2 orders of magnitudes
higher than the baseline measurements, regardless of the attack
norm and source class. As the number of features drops, all MMD
measurements grow at roughly the same exponential rate. However,
as the ratio of D̂ between training and adversarial samples to the
baseline values is maintained as f decreases, the gap between the
former and latter is in fact exponentially larger with smaller mod-
els. In other words, the statistical difference between genuine and
adversarial examples grows as the number of features decreases.
In Appendix A we provide a different view of the same result,
showing MMD using a linear scale, which illustrates better the
widening of the gap. We additionally show in Appendix A the cor-
responding experimental results for Ransomware and PDFMalware
datasets. The results and trends are similar to the those for MNIST,
so we omitted them in this section for the sake of brevity.
The results on L1 and L2 attacks show that despite the fact that
the raw minimal attack distance decreases with f , minimal attacks
exhibit stronger statistical divergence from clean attacks in lower
dimensions. This proves that unnormalised distance metrics are
inadequate for assessing the robustness of classifiers. In contrast,
our normalised distance metrics show similar trends to the statisti-
cal divergence of minimal adversarial samples, as smaller models
require exponentially stronger proportional perturbation and at
the same time, make attacks exponentially easier to detect. Hence,
our normalised distance metrics are more representative of the
attacker’s cost.
As adversarial examples are easier to detect with reduced feature
sets, if appropriate detection mechanisms are in place, such as the
ones proposed in [13] which rely on the use of MMD for detection
of adversarial exapmles, we can significantly enhance the security
of the machine learning system against evasion attacks.
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5 CONCLUSION
The existence of adversarial examples can hinder the penetration
of machine learning in application domains where the security
and safety of the system play a critical role. Defending against
this threat is challenging as adversarial examples are difficult to
classify or detect. Adversarial examples are produced in regions
where natural data points are scarce and where the learned model
differs from the optimal model we could theoretically learn with
knowledge of the underlying data distribution.
In this paper we have shown that embedded feature selection
helps to mitigate evasion attacks, reducing the regions that can be
leveraged by the attacker to craft successful adversarial examples.
We have also shown empirically that the statistical properties of ad-
versarial examples differ significantly from the genuine ones when
using a reduced set of features. This can facilitate their detection
and further mitigate the effect of evasion attacks.
We have also provided a design methodology to assess the se-
curity of machine learning classifiers against adversarial examples
under the effect of embedded feature selection. In contrast to previ-
ous related work where the security is measured according to the
absolute minimum perturbation required to evade the classifier, we
propose to use the relative distortion per feature, which allows us to
compare models with different features in a fairer way. Under this
metric, embedded feature selection produces more secure machine
learning classifiers. The statistical analysis of adversarial examples
with MMD supports the validity of our approach. Based on this
metric, we have also proposed a more general security score that
relies on the aggregation of the normalised minimum perturbation
for different attack strategies, where the perturbation is measured
with different distance metrics. By using this security score we have
shown that there exists a natural trade-off between accuracy and
security so that, in some cases, small reductions in the performance
of the algorithm can notably increase its security. Thus, our security
metric can help design and deploy more secure machine learning
systems.
It is also important to distinguish between feature representation
and feature selection and understand their security implications.
Good feature representations can help to reduce the chances of
evasion by the attacker through obfuscation or modification of
features that are not considered in the design of the system. On the
other hand, feature selection aims to remove features that are not
relevant or redundant, given the available data to train the model.
Thus, even if the attacker uses the removed features to craft the
adversarial example, it is difficult to evade the system, as the use of
these features is expected to bring little value or functionality.
Future research will include the analysis of different feature
selection schemes including filter and wrapper-methods, as well
as the development of asymmetrical feature selection techniques
to enhance the security of machine learning in anomaly detection
and related security applications.
REFERENCES
[1] Practical Black-Box Attacks against Machine Learning, author=Papernot, Nico-
las and McDaniel, Patrick and Goodfellow, Ian and Jha, Somesh and Celik, Z
Berkay and Swami, Ananthram, booktitle=Asia Conference on Computer and
Communications Security, pages=506–519, year=2017.
[2] Arjun Nitin Bhagoji, Daniel Cullina, and Prateek Mittal. 2017. Dimensionality
Reduction as a Defense against Evasion Attacks on Machine Learning Classifiers.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1704.02654 (2017).
[3] Battista Biggio, Igino Corona, Davide Maiorca, Blaine Nelson, Nedim Šrndić,
Pavel Laskov, Giorgio Giacinto, and Fabio Roli. 2013. Evasion Attacks against
Machine Learning at Test Time. In Joint European conference on machine learning
and knowledge discovery in databases. Springer, 387–402.
[4] Battista Biggio, Giorgio Fumera, and Fabio Roli. 2014. Security Evaluation of
Pattern Classifiers under Attack. IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data
Engineering 26, 4 (2014), 984–996.
[5] Battista Biggio, Blaine Nelson, and Pavel Laskov. 2012. Poisoning Attacks against
Support Vector Machines. In International Conference on Machine Learning. 1807–
1814.
[6] Nicholas Carlini and David Wagner. 2017. Adversarial Examples are not Easily
Detected: Bypassing Ten DetectionMethods. InWorkshop on Artificial Intelligence
and Security. 3–14.
[7] Nicholas Carlini and David Wagner. 2017. Towards Evaluating the Robustness
of Neural Networks. In IEEE Sympoisum on Security and Privacy. 39–57.
[8] John Duchi, Shai Shalev-Shwartz, Yoram Singer, and Tushar Chandra. 2008.
Efficient Projections onto The L1-ball for Learning in High Dimensions. In
International conference on Machine learning. ACM, 272–279.
[9] Reuben Feinman, Ryan R Curtin, Saurabh Shintre, and Andrew B Gardner. 2017.
Detecting Adversarial Samples from Artifacts. arXiv preprint arXiv:1703.00410
(2017).
[10] Robert Fortet and E Mourier. 1953. Convergence de la répartition empirique vers
la répartition théorique. In Annales scientifiques de l’École Normale Supérieure,
Vol. 70. Elsevier, 267–285.
[11] Ian Goodfellow, Jonathon Shlens, and Christian Szegedy. 2015. Explaining
and Harnessing Adversarial Examples. In International Conference on Learning
Representations.
[12] Arthur Gretton, Karsten M Borgwardt, Malte Rasch, Bernhard Schölkopf, and
Alex J Smola. 2007. A kernel method for the two-sample-problem. In Advances
in neural information processing systems. 513–520.
[13] Kathrin Grosse, Praveen Manoharan, Nicolas Papernot, Michael Backes, and
Patrick McDaniel. 2017. On the (Statistical) Detection of Adversarial Examples.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1702.06280 (2017).
[14] Shixiang Gu and Luca Rigazio. 2014. Towards Deep Neural Network Architec-
tures Robust to Adversarial Examples. arXiv preprint arXiv:1412.5068 (2014).
[15] DanHendrycks and Kevin Gimpel. 2016. EarlyMethods for Detecting Adversarial
Images. arXiv preprint arXiv:1608.00530 (2016).
[16] Ling Huang, Anthony D Joseph, Blaine Nelson, Benjamin IP Rubinstein, and
JD Tygar. 2011. Adversarial Machine Learning. In Workshop on Security and
Artificial Intelligence. 43–58.
[17] Matthew Jagielski, Alina Oprea, Battista Biggio, Chang Liu, Cristina Nita-Rotaru,
and Bo Li. 2018. Manipulating Machine Learning: Poisoning Attacks and Coun-
termeasures for Regression Learning. arXiv preprint arXiv:1804.00308 (2018).
[18] Jonghoon Jin, Aysegul Dundar, and Eugenio Culurciello. 2015. Robust Convolu-
tional Neural Networks under Adversarial Noise. arXiv preprint arXiv:1511.06306
(2015).
[19] Alexey Kurakin, Ian Goodfellow, and Samy Bengio. 2017. Adversarial Examples
in the Physical World. In International Conference on Learning Representations.
[20] Alexey Kurakin, Ian Goodfellow, and Samy Bengio. 2017. Adversarial Machine
Learning at Scale. In International Conference on Learning Representations.
[21] Hugo Larochelle, Yoshua Bengio, Jérôme Louradour, and Pascal Lamblin. 2009.
Exploring Strategies for Training Deep Neural Networks. Journal of machine
learning research 10, Jan (2009), 1–40.
[22] Yann LeCun, Léon Bottou, Yoshua Bengio, and Patrick Haffner. 1998. Gradient-
Based Learning Applied to Document Recognition. Proc. IEEE 86, 11 (1998),
2278–2324.
[23] Xin Li and Fuxin Li. 2017. Adversarial Examples Detection in Deep Networks
with Convolutional Filter Statistics. In International Conference on Computer
Vision. 5775–5783.
[24] Daniel Lowd and Christopher Meek. 2005. Adversarial Learning. In SIGKDD
International Conference on Knowledge Discovery in Data Mining. 641–647.
[25] Aleksander Madry, Aleksandar Makelov, Ludwig Schmidt, Dimitris Tsipras, and
Adrian Vladu. 2018. Towards Deep Learning Models Resistant to Adversarial
Attacks. In International Conference on Learning Representations.
[26] Patrick McDaniel, Nicolas Papernot, and Z Berkay Celik. 2016. Machine Learning
in Adversarial Settings. IEEE Security & Privacy 3 (2016), 68–72.
[27] Shike Mei and Xiaojin Zhu. 2015. Using Machine Teaching to Identify Optimal
Training-Set Attacks on Machine Learners. In AAAI. 2871–2877.
[28] Jan Hendrik Metzen, Tim Genewein, Volker Fischer, and Bastian Bischoff. 2017.
On Detecting Adversarial Perturbations. In International Conference on Learning
Representations.
[29] Seyed-Mohsen Moosavi-Dezfooli, Alhussein Fawzi, Omar Fawzi, and Pascal
Frossard. 2017. Universal Adversarial Perturbations. In IEEE Conference on
Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition. 1765–1773.
[30] Seyed-Mohsen Moosavi-Dezfooli, Alhussein Fawzi, and Pascal Frossard. 2016.
Deepfool: a Simple and Accurate Method to fool Deep Neural Networks. In IEEE
10
Figure 10: MMD estimates for the MNIST dataset and minimal attacks with different feature counts.
Figure 11: MMD estimates for the Ransomware dataset and minimal attacks with different feature counts.
11
Figure 12: MMD estimates for the PDF Malware dataset and minimal attacks with different feature counts.
Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition. 2574–2582.
[31] Luis Muñoz González and Emil C Lupu. 2018. The Secret of Machine Learning.
ITNOW 60, 1 (2018), 38–39.
[32] Luis Muñoz-González, Battista Biggio, Ambra Demontis, Andrea Paudice, Vasin
Wongrassamee, Emil C Lupu, and Fabio Roli. 2017. Towards Poisoning of Deep
Learning Algorithms with Back-Gradient Optimization. InWorkshop on Artificial
Intelligence and Security. 27–38.
[33] Blaine Nelson, Marco Barreno, Fuching Jack Chi, Anthony D Joseph, Benjamin IP
Rubinstein, Udam Saini, Charles A Sutton, J Doug Tygar, and Kai Xia. 2008.
Exploiting Machine Learning to Subvert Your Spam Filter. LEET 8 (2008), 1–9.
[34] Blaine Nelson, Benjamin Rubinstein, Ling Huang, Anthony Joseph, Shing-hon
Lau, Steven Lee, Satish Rao, Anthony Tran, and Doug Tygar. 2010. Near-Optimal
Evasion of Convex-Inducing Classifiers. In International Conference on Artificial
Intelligence and Statistics. 549–556.
[35] Nicolas Papernot, Patrick McDaniel, and Ian Goodfellow. 2016. Transferability
in Machine Learning: from Phenomena to Black-Box Attacks using Adversarial
Samples. arXiv preprint arXiv:1605.07277 (2016).
[36] Nicolas Papernot, PatrickMcDaniel, Somesh Jha,Matt Fredrikson, Z Berkay Celik,
and Ananthram Swami. 2016. The Limitations of Deep Learning in Adversarial
Settings. In Security and Privacy (EuroS&P), 2016 IEEE European Symposium on.
372–387.
[37] Nicolas Papernot, Patrick McDaniel, Arunesh Sinha, and Michael Wellman. 2018.
Towards the Science of Security and Privacy in Machine Learning. In European
Symposium on Security and Privacy.
[38] Nicolas Papernot, Patrick McDaniel, Xi Wu, Somesh Jha, and Ananthram Swami.
2016. Distillation as a Defense to Adversarial Perturbations Against Deep Neural
Networks. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy.
[39] Daniele Sgandurra, Luis Muñoz-González, Rabih Mohsen, and Emil C Lupu. 2016.
Automated Dynamic Analysis of Ransomware: Benefits, Limitations and use for
Detection. arXiv preprint arXiv:1609.03020 (2016).
[40] Uri Shaham, Yutaro Yamada, and Sahand Negahban. 2015. Understanding Ad-
versarial Training: Increasing Local Stability of Neural Nets through Robust
Optimization. arXiv preprint arXiv:1511.05432 (2015).
[41] Carl-Johann Simon-Gabriel, Yann Ollivier, Bernhard Schölkopf, Léon Bottou, and
David Lopez-Paz. 2018. Adversarial Vulnerability of Neural Networks Increases
With Input Dimension. arXiv preprint arXiv:1802.01421 (2018).
[42] Christian Szegedy, Vincent Vanhoucke, Sergey Ioffe, Jon Shlens, and Zbigniew
Wojna. 2016. Rethinking the Inception Architecture for Computer Vision. In
Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition. 2818–2826.
[43] Christian Szegedy, Wojciech Zaremba, Ilya Sutskever, Joan Bruna, Dumitru
Erhan, Ian Goodfellow, and Rob Fergus. 2013. Intriguing Properties of Neural
Networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1312.6199 (2013).
[44] Robert Tibshirani. 1996. Regression Shrinkage and Selection via the Lasso.
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series B (Methodological) (1996), 267–288.
[45] Florian Tramèr, Alexey Kurakin, Nicolas Papernot, Ian Goodfellow, Dan Boneh,
and Patrick McDaniel. 2018. Ensemble Adversarial Training: Attacks and De-
fenses. In International Conference on Learning Representations.
[46] Fei Wang, Wei Liu, and Sanjay Chawla. 2014. On sparse feature attacks in
adversarial learning. In International Conference on Data Mining. 1013–1018.
[47] Fei Zhang, Patrick PK Chan, Battista Biggio, Daniel S Yeung, and Fabio Roli.
2016. Adversarial Feature Selection against Evasion Attacks. IEEE Transactions
on Cybernetics 46, 3 (2016), 766–777.
[48] Stephan Zheng, Yang Song, Thomas Leung, and Ian Goodfellow. 2016. Improv-
ing the Robustness of Deep Neural Networks via Stability Training. In IEEE
Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition. 4480–4488.
A EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF MMD
Similar to Figure 9, 10 we show in Figure theMMD analysis with the
MNIST dataset on a linear scale, where the significant differences
between the properties of the genuine and the adversarial examples
are prominent.
Figures 11 and 12 show the same analysis for Ransomware and
PDFMalware datasets respectively. The results in these two datasets
are similar to those of MNIST.
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